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Abstract 
I estimate spillovers from new housing supply on house prices, crime rates, and household income. To 
estimate these effects, I use exogenous variation in supply induced by a housing subsidy implemented 
in middle-income neighborhoods in the city of Montevideo. The program incentivized residential 
development through tax breaks that led to sizable investments in certain neighborhoods. I exploit the 
spatial structure of the scheme to identify the externalities and find clear evidence of spillovers from 
new supply on house prices, with prices increasing between 12 and 17%. Property crime rates only 
decreased in the short term, while there is evidence of an increase in household income, suggesting 
that the neighborhood income mix responded to the supply expansion. Increasing supply appears to 
revitalize neighborhoods, but these effects also reduce housing affordability. 
 
 
 
Key words: housing supply, house prices, neighborhood change, crime, difference-in-differences, 
housing policies 
JEL Codes: R23; R30; R58 
 
 
 
This paper was produced as part of the Centre’s Urban Programme.  The Centre for Economic 
Performance is financed by the Economic and Social Research Council. 
 
 
 
I am grateful for the comments received from Elisabet Viladecans-Marsal, Jordi Jofre-Monseny, 
Laurent Gobillon, Miren Lafourcade, Henry Overman, Gilles Duranton, Felipe Carozzi, Gabriel 
Ahlfeldt, Camille Hémet, Jorge de la Roca, Javier Vázquez-Grenno, Amedeo Piolatto, Dirk Foremny, 
Guillaume Chapelle, Jan Stuhler, and participants at the l’X/UEA Summer School in Urban 
Economics (Paris), UEA (Copenhagen), IEB seminars, the Public Policies, Cities and Regions 
workshop (Lyon), the 13th meeting of the UEA (New York), and the CEP Annual Conference 2019. 
 Nicolás González-Pampillón, What Works Centre for Local Economic Growth, Centre for 
Economic Performance, London School of Economics.  
 
 
 
Published by 
Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
 
 
 
All rights reserved.  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or 
transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of the publisher nor 
be issued to the public or circulated in any form other than that in which it is published. 
 
 
 
Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should be sent to the 
editor at the above address. 
 
 
 
 N. González-Pampillón, submitted 2019. 
1. Introduction
Increasing affordability problems in cities across the developed world have often been met
with calls to increase the supply response and increase building output. For example, a large
debate has emerged around the stringency of regulatory restrictions on new development, with
several studies indicating that tight planning constraints in some US cities have led to increases in
housing prices (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2009, 2018). Nevertheless, this enthusiasm for increased
supply at the city level often overlooks the local effects of new housing stock. Within a city, the
spatial distribution of these new dwellings may have important implications for neighborhood
change. New supply may generate spillovers on the nearby existing housing stock. First, when-
ever the newly built units replace vacant or deteriorated structures or brownfields, the quality
of the neighborhood improves (Owens, Rossi-Hansberg and Sarte, 2010; Campbell, Giglio and
Pathak, 2010). Second, households moving into the new dwellings are seen as an amenity by
their neighbors, provided they are of a higher (or at least similar) socioeconomic status (Dia-
mond and McQuade, 2019). This channel may be reinforced if other higher-income residents
are attracted to these neighborhoods (Guerrieri, Hartley and Hurst, 2013). Under spatial equi-
librium conditions, all these neighborhood improved amenities are capitalized into higher house
prices. If these external effects are substantial, then housing prices are predicted to increase
locally even if increased supply reduces prices at the city level. Thus, to incorporate the full
impact of new housing on our neighbors and cities, it is important to obtain causal estimates of
external effects and analyze how they extend across space.
In this paper, I estimate spillovers resulting from new housing developments on three differ-
ent outcomes. First, I study spillovers on the price of existing properties located next to the new
housing stock. Second, I estimate the effects of new supply on local crime rates. Crime rep-
resents a neighborhood (dis)amenity, and there is substantial evidence of a causal link between
crime rates and house prices (Gibbons, 2004; Pope, 2008; Linden and Rockoff, 2008; Ihlanfeldt
and Mayock, 2010). New housing supply can reduce the number of vacant lots and abandoned
structures that may be linked to criminal activities (Spelman, 1993; Ellen, Lacoe and Sharygin,
2013; Cui and Walsh, 2015). New units may also attract more affluent residents who are less
likely to engage in criminal activities and more prone to invest in security measures (i.e., alarms,
cameras, etc., Farrell et al. (2011)). On the other hand, the level of income is positively related
to the number of property crimes (Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls, 1997). Ultimately, which
effect prevails remains an empirical question, which I will answer below. Finally, I estimate
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the effect of residential investment on local household incomes, as the new supply may induce
changes in the neighborhood composition (Brueckner and Rosenthal, 2009; Rosenthal and Ross,
2015).
In my empirical strategy, I make use of exogenous variation in the spatial distribution of
residential development induced by a housing policy implemented in the city of Montevideo,
Uruguay starting in 2011.1 The program consisted of a series of tax breaks to developers and
private investors aimed at promoting the introduction of new housing stock into certain neigh-
borhoods, with the program applying to new developments in a spatially defined middle-income
area within the city.2 The borders of the subsidized (or targeted) area follow a number of city
divisions provided by the main avenues and streets, without following the boundaries of any
administrative area.3 There is no official document describing the criteria used to select the sub-
sidized area, but its design reveals the intention of excluding high-income areas of the city, where
most of the private residential investments had taken place in the past.4 Investments carried out
under this program were sizable, totaling 1.5% of the country’s GDP. There were no explicit
rules regarding the socioeconomic characteristics of buyers or tenants of newly built units, and
developers ended up producing housing affordable for middle-high/high-income households.
As will be shown below, the policy pushed new construction into the targeted area, especially
to those neighborhoods located close to the spatial boundary. My analysis uses 98 of these large
housing projects (approximately 3.3M USD per project) executed between 2011 and 2013 to
study the spatial spillovers of new housing stock on house prices, crime rates and neighborhood
composition. To estimate these effects, I construct a dataset combining information on the indi-
vidual projects with data on the universe of housing transactions, daily crime records and survey
data on household incomes.
Estimating spillovers is challenging because new developments may be located in areas with
high expectations of future price growth. One of the contributions of this paper is to overcome
this concern by taking advantage of the policy to generate an exogenous change to the spatial
distribution of residential housing investments in the city. My identifying assumption requires
1The Department of Montevideo has 1.3M inhabitants, while its metropolitan area houses 1.9M, making it the
largest urban area in the country.
2Subsidized areas were set by the Ministry of Housing in conjunction with the Ministry of Economics and
Finance and the Local Government of Montevideo. In these areas, tax breaks applied to housing projects, which
implied the production of a number of new homes to sell or rent.
3I use the terms subsidized, targeted, and treated area interchangeably.
4It also excludes the suburbs and other areas where most of the slums are located, which are hardly targeted by
developers.
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that developers are not able to manipulate the borders of the subsidized areas in response to
expected changes in prices or other neighborhood characteristics. In my analysis, I use estimates
from a boundary discontinuity design (BDD) to show that while average housing prices are
higher in subsidized areas, pretreatment prices are smooth at the policy boundary, suggesting
that differences in housing prices did not dictate the definition of the treated area. This also
indicates that there are no major cross-border differences in the level of initial local amenities.
In addition, I report that no discontinuities in housing prices of existing units emerge after the
law came into force, which is likely to be explained by external effects spilling into nontreated
areas. These spillovers rule out the application of a BDD (as in Black (1999); Dell (2010)) to
measure causal effects.
My main estimates are obtained using a difference-in-differences (DiD) strategy exploiting
house price changes of unsubsidized sold units in different narrowly defined bands around the
treatment border before and after the policy. To avoid contamination by the spillovers from new
development, the control group comprises a set of properties in an unsubsidized area located
over 400 meters from the border. Because not all of the area targeted by the policy experiences
an increase in housing supply, this analysis yields intention-to-treat estimates. Alternatively, I
can use the realized spatial pattern of new developments to estimate the effect of externalities us-
ing a continuous difference-in-differences estimator. For this purpose, I construct a measure that
captures the investment exposure of each existing housing unit to subsidized projects by com-
puting the weighted sum of all nearby investments using exponential distance decay weights.
Since the investment intensity variable can be endogenous, I instrument this measure using a
binary indicator that takes a value of one for units located in the subsidized area, thus exploiting
the place-based nature of the subsidy.
I find evidence of substantial – but highly local – spillover effects of new residential devel-
opment.5 DiD estimates using bands around the policy area boundary show that house prices
increase by approximately 12% close to the border in the treated locations. External effects
vanish after roughly two hundred meters from the border on the unsubsidized side. Based on
the continuous DiD strategy, I observe a 15-17% increase in house prices in areas with high
intensity of subsidized investments. Estimates of price effects are heterogeneous with respect
to neighborhood characteristics. In census tracts with a high share of renters, I find a consider-
5My reduced form results are in line with the estimates obtained in Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) resulting from estimat-
ing a quantitative model, with residential externalities being highly local.
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ably larger impact of new developments on housing prices, which may be explained by a higher
turnover allowing for a faster gentrification process. Additional estimates indicate a significant
effect of new developments on property crime, showing a reduction ranging between 20% and
30%. My event-study graphs show that this reduction is temporary, suggesting that it is a result
of the removal of vacant/disused structures that were replaced by the new developments. Finally,
the results show an increase in household income per capita.
This paper contributes to the scarce literature analyzing the effect of new housing supply
on neighborhoods and housing markets. Ooi and Le (2013) and Zahirovich-Herbert and Gibler
(2014) analyze spillovers on local housing prices from new residential construction using a
ring regression approach, which hardly mitigates endogeneity concerns due to developers’ in-
vestment location decisions. Based on simulated evidence from a neighborhood choice model,
Anenberg and Kung (2018) find that increasing supply has negligible effects on rents. Brueckner
and Rosenthal (2009) develop a model that predicts how residential development and redevel-
opment affect the income composition of neighborhoods. Here, I provide causal estimates by
exploiting exogenous (spatial) variation in residential construction. Boustan et al. (2019) analyze
whether a higher density of condominiums attracts high-income residents to estimate whether
supply-side factors can drive gentrification in urban cores. Instead, I focus on estimating local
spillover effects of new supply on the housing market.
This paper is related to the literature examining the spillovers from affordable housing devel-
opments in the US. Specifically, a large number of studies have investigated the effect of the Low
Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC). Spillovers from developments built under this program are
more likely to result from changes in neighborhood composition, rather than from externalities
associated with the physical characteristics of dwellings. Baum-Snow and Marion (2009) and
Diamond and McQuade (2019) find evidence of positive spillovers on house prices when the
subsidized units are located in lower-income neighborhoods, but Diamond and McQuade (2019)
find negative externalities when units are located in higher-income neighborhoods. Freedman
and Owens (2011) analyze the effects of LIHTC on crime at the county level, finding a significant
reduction in violent crime but no detectable effects on property crime. Schwartz et al. (2006)
study spillovers from place-based subsidized housing in New York using a ring regression ap-
proach. One key difference of my paper relative to this literature is that the new developments
studied here are not targeted to low-income households. Therefore, my results may be better
suited to understanding the spillover effects from regular, private construction activity in the
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residential sector.
Finally, this paper draws on previous studies estimating externalities resulting from urban
renewal interventions (Owens, Rossi-Hansberg and Sarte, 2010; Ahlfeldt, Maennig and Richter,
2016; Koster and Van Ommeren, 2018), which find mild to moderate evidence of housing ex-
ternalities and very localized effects.6 From a methodological perspective, my paper relates to
Turner, Haughwout and Klaauw (2014), who estimate external effects of land use regulation on
land values, exploiting the fact that land use regulation varies across municipal borders. One
advantage of using a within-city boundary is that local policies vary smoothly over space so
that substantial differences in local public services and other unobservables between treated and
control locations are unlikely.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I describe the housing policy. In
section 3, I develop a simple theoretical framework. In section 4, I describe the data. In section
5, I outline the empirical method used. In section 6, the results are presented, and finally, I
conclude in section 7.
2. A subsidy for private residential housing investors
In August 2011, the Uruguayan government introduced tax breaks for private investments
in housing (Law Nbr. 18,975).7 The policy aimed at incentivizing the construction sector, as
well as improving the stock of housing for both sale and rent. It does not impose requirements
regarding the characteristics of buyers and tenants; subsequently, developers mainly produced
housing that was just affordable for middle-high/high-income households.8 Tax benefits apply
to new construction and rehabilitation projects, with 73% of all projects being new builds.9 New
construction projects had substantially larger (on average, 11 times) budgets than rehabilitation
projects, which overall had low budgets. In my empirical analysis, I only focus on new con-
6By one half every 1,000 feet in Owens, Rossi-Hansberg and Sarte (2010). Koster and Van Ommeren (2018)
find mild evidence of spatial externalities. Gabriel M. Ahlfeldt, Wolfgang Maennig and Feliz J. Richter (2016) find
no evidence in favor of the housing externality hypothesis, as house prices in the area surrounding the intervention
do not exhibit a relative increase in price.
7Projects are allowed to include a small number of commercial units (up to 10% of the total produced units),
but no tax benefits are given for these units.
8In Montevideo, the average price (in m2) of a subsidized unit is approximately 2,700 USD, while the average
for the city is 1,896 USD, and the average in the case of high-income neighborhoods is 2,591 USD. There were
price caps for a portion of units of projects located in some areas of the city, but these price limits were not binding.
Since concerns were expressed about the prices of subsidized units, in 2017, the government set lower price caps
to improve affordability.
9Rehabilitation projects involve upgrading, in addition to increasing the total number of housing units in deteri-
orated properties, usually semidetached houses.
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struction developed under this policy.
Projects were required to produce at least two and up to a maximum of 100 new residen-
tial units per land lot, thus subsidizing the construction of semidetached houses or flats. The
upper limit requirement did not apply for projects undertaken on large vacant lots or lots con-
taining disused factories or abandoned homes. There were also size requirements for each unit
depending on the number of bedrooms.10 Regarding quality, the new units had to adhere to
the guidelines laid down in the National Housing Plan (Law Nbr. 13,728) and other ministerial
regulations, which established requirements on the materials used. Tax breaks only applied to
projects undertaken in urban areas, excluding those in cities with a high proportion of second
homes.
The main fiscal advantage for developers and private investors was an exemption from paying
any corporate tax (25%) on the sold units, while rents were partially exempted from personal
income and corporate taxes over a nine-year period.11 Applications were submitted at any time
of the year. Submissions were evaluated by the National Housing Agency (Agencia Nacional de
Vivienda, ANV) and, later, by a committee made up of members from theMinistry of Economics
and Finance and the Ministry of Housing, both responsible for implementing the policy.
Regarding new construction projects, 494 were performed between December 2011 and De-
cember 2018, involving approximately 15.5K new housing units. The total amount invested for
these subsidized projects was 990M USD, equivalent to approximately 1.5% of the 2011-2018
average GDP in USD. Despite being a national policy, 70% of these projects were concentrated
in the city of Montevideo. My empirical analysis focuses on 98 subsidized new construction
projects promoted and executed in Montevideo between 2011 and 2013 (approximately 3.3M
USD per project), with an average construction period of 1.8 years. The tax exemptions per
housing unit amounted to roughly 17K USD on average, which represents approximately 21%
of the construction costs.12 In Montevideo, the subsidy had a place-based structure for new con-
struction. As observed in Figure 1, only in area S did the tax breaks apply to new construction
10>32 m2 and <50 m2 for one-bedroom units. With each additional bedroom (up to a total of four), the lower
bound increased by 12m2 while the upper increased by 19m2. The number of single-bedroom units must be lower
than 50% of the total number of produced units.
11Other fiscal benefits included exemptions from the wealth tax on land and improvements during construction,
as well as on built and subsequently rented units over nine years. Additionally, private investors were exempted
from paying the transfer tax (2% of the property appraisal value) if buying their unsold units. There were also tax
credits for value-added tax on national and imported inputs, which, given the structure of these taxes, potentially
reduced liquidity constraints and opportunity costs for developers.
12The National Statistical Office (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, INE) reports the cost of building one square
meter according to house quality type, as defined in the National Housing Plan.
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projects.
The treated area S was defined by the Ministry of Housing, together with the Ministry of
Economics and Finance and the Local Government of Montevideo. Overall, it adhered to a
number of natural city divisions provided by the main avenues and streets, and the area did not
follow the borders of any other administrative division.13 The law was intended to include the
city’s central neighborhoods in the targeted area, as revitalizing these neighborhoods was among
the government’s priorities, and to exclude the high-income areas of the city (those labeled asU ).
The subsidized area represents 52% of the total urbanized area of Montevideo, followed by the
suburbs (29%) and the unsubsidized area (19%). It has a population density of 7,740 inhabitants
per km2, and it is composed of both central and peripheral neighborhoods, representing a highly
heterogeneous area. This heterogeneity is also observed in income. Area U is the densest area
(8,084 inhabitants per km2), and it is also the richest part of the city, with an average household
income double and triple that in area S and the suburbs, respectively. In contrast, the suburbs
include the highest share of slums and have the lowest average income.
3. Theoretical framework
I develop a simple residential choice model based on Glaeser (2008), Banzhaf and Walsh
(2013) and González-Pampillón, Jofre-Monseny and Viladecans-Marsal (2019) to explain how
new housing supply in a given area of a given city impacts housing prices and the neighborhood
income mix in that area. According to this model, on increasing the housing stock, housing
prices change due to an increase in the level of neighborhood (exogenous) amenities (i.e., re-
placing vacant or disused structures by new dwellings) and because more affluent residents are
attracted to these neighborhoods. As a countervailing effect, increasing the number of new
dwellings exerts a downward pressure on prices.
The model considers one city with two communities (1 and 2), and the stock of housing in
each community is denoted by S1 and S2, respectively. The size of the city is normalized to
be one, and thus, S1 + S2 = 1. Under this assumption, S1 and S2 represent the proportions
of the total housing stock in each community or the sizes of the community in relative terms.
13Regarding school assignment, the private sector accounts for a large share of the city’s schooling supply.
Specifically, 44% and 50% of the primary and secondary schools in Montevideo are private, respectively (INEEd,
2014). Assignment of students to public schools is, overall, not residence based.
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I further assume that the stock of housing in community 1 is larger than that in community 2
(S1 > S2). The housing stock is categorized as new (N ) or old (O); hence, S1 = S
N
1 + S
O
1 and
S2 = S
N
2 + S
O
2 . I also assume that the proportion of new dwellings in community 2 is larger
than that in community 1 (SN2 > S
N
1 ).
14
There are two groups in the city: high-income households (denoted by H), and middle-
income households (denoted by M ).15 P is the proportion of high-income households in the
city. P1 and P2 denote the proportions of high-income households in communities 1 and 2,
respectively. Then, the proportion of high-income households in the city can be defined as
P = S1P1 + S2P2. I assume that the proportion of high-income households in the city is
slightly larger than the stock of housing in community 2 and that the number of middle-income
households is larger than the number of high-income households in the city (H < M ). This
implies that S2 ≤ P < .5. I restrict the model to equilibria such that P2 > P1, meaning that
there is always a higher proportion of higher-income households living in the neighborhood with
a newer housing stock.
The preferences of group H to live in community 1 are given by the following utility func-
tion: UH1 = Y
H − Q + αH(P1) + G
H + ah, where Y
H is the average income of high-income
households. Q denotes the price of housing in community 1 relative to community 2. αH(P1)
represents the endogenous neighborhood amenities, and it is related to the fact that high-income
households have a preference to live among households of their own type. GH represents the
level of neighborhood exogenous amenities which, among other factors, depends on the age of
the housing stock in community 1, GH(γH , S
N
1 , S
O
1 ). ah is an individual specific term that re-
flects the attachment of individual h to community 1, and it is uniformly distributed in the unit
interval, i.e., ah ∼ U(0, 1). Similarly, the preference of H to live in community 2 is represented
by the following utility function: UH2 = Y
H +αH(P2). In the case of groupM , utilities in com-
munities 1 and 2 are given by UM1 = Y
M −Q−αM(P1)+G
M +am and U
M
2 = Y
M −αM(P2),
respectively. I assume that γH > γM , which implies that high-income individuals are more
likely to be able to afford the new residential units and that they have a stronger preference for
a younger housing stock.16 Finally, I assume that Y H > Y M and that αM(Pk) = 0, imply-
ing that the middle-income group is indifferent to living among their middle-income peers or
14Within each community, I assume that SN1 < S
O
1 , and that S
N
2 > S
O
2 .
15Low-income households reside mostly in the suburbs. The model can be extended to include three income
groups. However, for simplicity, I work with two income groups.
16This assumption is in line with the evidence in Rosenthal (2008); Brueckner and Rosenthal (2009)
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higher-income households.
By equalizing the utility functions of H and M across communities, I obtain the bid func-
tions of each income group,
QH(ah∗) = α
H(P1)− α
H(P2) +G
H + ah∗ (1)
QM(am∗) = G
M + am∗ (2)
To solve the model, I equalize bid functions (QH(ah∗) = Q
M(am∗)), and I also use the fact
that, in equilibrium, the supply of housing units equals that of demand in both communities. I
obtain the solution for the share of high-income households that choose to reside in community
1 (P1) and for housing prices (Q):
17
P1 = P +
P (1− P )
S1
[
αH(P1)− α
H(P2) +G
H −GM
]
(3)
Q = 1− S1 + PG
H + (1− P )GM + P [αH(P1)− α
H(P2)] (4)
Figure 2 summarizes the model and plots the previous four expressions. The bid functions
of H and M (vertical axis) represent the willingness to pay for living in community 1 rela-
tive to community 2 for each income type, and they are plotted as a function of the share of
income group H in community 1 (horizontal axis). The solid line represents the bid function
of high-income households (H). It presents a mild curvature due to some preference of the
high-income group to live among their own income type. The dashed line is the bid function
of middle-income households (M ), which has a downward slope as a regular demand function.
The housing price Q and high-income share P1 in equilibrium given in expressions 3 and 4,
respectively, are graphically represented by the intersection of the bid functions. The top panel
shows that there is a low share of high-income households (6%) living in community 1, mainly
because of having an older housing stock compared to community 2.
17Equalizing bid functions leads to the following equation: ah∗ = G
M + αH(P1)− α
H(P2) +G
H + am∗ . For
community 1, the market clearing condition in the housing market implies that S1 = (1−am∗)(1−P )+(1−ah∗)P .
I also know that (1 − P1)S1 = (1 − am∗)(1 − P ). Using these three expressions, I obtain a solution for P1 as a
function of P2. Since P2 = (P − S1P1)/S2, after solving for P1, I also obtain a solution for P2. After solving for
P1 and P2, I derive the expression for housing prices Q.
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3.1. The effect of new housing supply
I analyze the effect of increasing the number of new dwellings in community 1 on house
prices and the neighborhood income mix. The government introduces a housing policy to incen-
tivize new construction in community 1, and as a result, the share of new units increases (SN1 ↑)
in that community. This policy affects P1 and Q since both depend on S
N
1 . I first compute the
derivative of P1 with respect to S
N
1 :
dP1
dSN1
=
P (1−P )
S1
(γH − γM)− P (1−P )
S2
1
[
αH(P1)− α
H(P2) +G
H −GM
]
1− P (1−P )
S1
[
αH
′
(P1) + αH
′
(P2)
S1
S2
] (5)
This derivative is positive only if the effect of improving the (exogenous) amenities is larger
for the high-income group H than for the middle-income group (γH > γM ), a condition that is
satisfied by assumption.18 In Figure 2, I analyze the effect of increasing the share of new houses
in community 1, which is graphically represented as an upward shift of both bid functions in
housing prices. The upward shift is larger for high-income dwellers, as they are more likely
to buy the new homes. As a result, I observe that the share of high-income households in
neighborhood 1 is larger in the new equilibrium, doubling the initial share (of 6%) to 12%.
The effect of increasing SN1 on house prices is given by the following derivative:
dQ
dSN1
= −1︸︷︷︸
Supply effect
+PγH + (1− P )γM︸ ︷︷ ︸
Amenity effect
+
dP1
dSN1
[
P
(
αH
′
(P1) + α
H
′
(P2)
P1
S2
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in the neighborhood income composition
(6)
There are three effects. The first is negative, and it is related to the number of new houses in
community 1. The other two are positive. Local spillovers on house prices can emerge via two
other channels. First, there is an amenity effect due to the increasing stock of new housing in
community 1 (i.e., less deteriorated structures). The second channel is given by changes in the
18P1 is a function that maps into itself: P1 = H(P1). Since I only focus on stable equilibria
(H ′ < 1), the denominator is positive. Hence, the derivative in 5 is positive if P (1−P )
S1
(γH − γM ) >
P (1−P )
S2
1
[
αH(P1)− α
H(P2) +G
H −GM
]
. Assuming that αk(Pl) = α
kP 2
l
(with k = H,M and l = 1, 2)
and defining Gi = γi(F + SN1 ) with F < 0 (worse amenities in community 1), the latter expression is reduced to
(γH − γM )[S1− (F +S
N
1 )] > α
H(P 21 −P
2
2 ). By assumption P2 > P1 > 0, then, 0 > α
H(P 21 −P
2
2 ). Therefore,
if γH > γM , then dP1
dSN
1
> 0.
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neighborhood income composition since P1 increases with S
N
1 , as shown in expression 5. Given
that αH
′
(Pk) > 0 (with k = 1, 2), it is straightforward to check that this second effect is also
positive. The sum of these three effects is observed in Figure 2. Provided that the supply effect is
not sizable, the model predicts that new housing supply increases house prices in community 1.
Expression 6 suggests that the policy provides an exogenous increase in the stock of new units
in community 1 that ends up affecting house prices. My reduced form estimates will capture
the total effect, which is composed of the amenity effect, changes in the neighborhood income
mix, and the supply effect. Within community 1, the distribution of H-type households will
depend on the distance to the new amenities as in a model of housing externalities (Owens,
Rossi-Hansberg and Sarte, 2010). Higher-income households are likely to concentrate close to
newer units. Similarly, house prices are likely to experience larger increases in the surroundings
of newly built homes than elsewhere. In the empirical analysis, I provide an estimate of the
decaying rate of these externalities.
4. Data & variables
I use and combine data from different sources. First, I use official data from the National
Housing Agency (Agencia Nacional de Vivienda) related to subsidized projects. These data
contain information about project location, including street address and the reference number in
the land register, approval date, total number of housing units produced (including commercial
units and lofts), the total budget and budget schedule, whether the project includes facilities and
amenities (e.g., garages), and three categories for project size (large, medium and small).
Second, I use data on house prices from the National Registry Office (Dirección General de
Registros, DGR) for the period 2006-2018. These data provide information on prices of housing
transactions and built area (in square meters) reported by notaries who are in charge of regis-
tering this information in the DGR. It has been used by the National Statistical Office (Instituto
Nacional de Estadística, INE) to compute housing prices indices. I focus on the logarithm of
these transacted prices (in USD), being my main outcomes of interest. I exclude transactions
with prices outside the bottom and top fifth percentiles by year and separately for houses and
buildings to avoid outliers. I also drop transactions of subsidized sold units. This dataset is
combined with data on housing characteristics from the National Cadaster Agency (Dirección
Nacional de Catastro, DNC), which generally updates its records whenever the property is re-
assessed by the DNC. The data I use are based on properties mostly reassessed between 2008
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and 2010.
Third, I use geo-coded daily crime incidents in Montevideo between 2006 and 2018 recorded
by the National Police Department. This database has been used by Ajzenman and Jaitman
(2016) to study crime concentration and crime hotspots in Montevideo and in other Latin Amer-
ican cities. Munyo and Rossi (2015) use this data to study crime recidivism. This database
records 1,331,357 offenses, and it contains information about types of crime according to the
Uruguayan penal code. In my analysis, I consider the total number of recorded crimes, and I
also focus on the three most frequent offenses, which I classify as either property or nonprop-
erty crimes. Under property crimes, I include thefts (53% of the total recorded incidents) and
robberies (13% of the total recorded incidents). Both theft and robbery imply depriving a person
of her/his property. However, robbery involves the use of violence. Nonproperty crimes include
assault (4% of the total recorded incidents), defined as a physical attack upon another person. I
aggregate this information at the census tract level, on which, on average, approximately 1,162
inhabitants reside, and it has an area of a half-square kilometer. Specifically, I focus on the
logarithm of yearly counts of total crime, property crime and nonproperty crime.
Fourth, I use data from the National Household Survey (Encuesta Continua de Hogares,
ECH), a yearly stratified random sample of households, from 2006 to 2018. I focus on the
logarithm of the monthly disposable household income per capita with and without rental value
as the outcome that measures the level of income of dwellers.19 I combine household income
data with a measure of the level of exposure to the policy (which I present in the next section) at
the census tract level, as the survey presents census tract identifiers.
Finally, I use data from the 2011 census conducted by the INE, which contains socioeco-
nomic information that allows constructing tract-level controls. A tract is the lowest level of
aggregation at which the 2011 census is disclosed.
Table 1 presents the average values of the outcome variables (in 2011) used and of the 2011
census variables for the subsidized and unsubsidized sides of the border. On the subsidized side,
house prices are lower than on the neighboring unsubsidized side, even much lower than house
prices in more distant locations in the nontreated part. Total crime and property crime rates are
slightly lower in the targeted area, while nonproperty crime is slightly larger, a stylized fact in
Latin American cities, as property crime is more often committed in higher-income neighbor-
19The rental value is the reported amount that renters pay for their house/flat. In case of owner-occupied, the
rental market value is inputted.
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hoods. Household income shows a similar pattern as house prices. Regarding socioeconomic
variables from the 2011 census, the subsidized part has a larger share of rented dwellings, a
higher unemployment rate, and a larger percentage of low-educated head of households com-
pared with tracts located on the unsubsidized side of the border. It also presents a higher street
quality index, partly explained by central areas having a number of bus lines, the main means
of public transportation in the city, which is one of the variables included in the index. Finally,
nontreated neighborhoods are slightly denser and characterized by a larger share of buildings,
thus having a more inelastic housing supply.
5. Empirical approach
The aim of this paper is to estimate the local effects that residential developments have on
housing price of neighboring dwellings, as well as on crime records and household income. I use
two empirical strategies to estimate spillovers on house prices. First, I compare changes in house
prices on either side of the border with changes in house prices within an unsubsidized area far
from the border before and after the introduction of the housing policy. Specifically, I consider a
standard difference-in-differences method that exploits house price changes in different narrowly
defined bands before and after policy implementation. Then, I estimate the following equation:
ln(pibt) = α
Ssbi + α
Uubi + β
Ssbi × post+ β
Uubi × post
+ X
′
iθ + δt + νb + δt × νb + ǫibt (7)
where ln(pibt) is the log-price of sold housing i in year-month t. The border is almost twelve
kilometers long, comprising neighborhoods with different socioeconomic characteristics. Then,
I partition the boundary into six border segments b (each approximately two kilometers long)
based on census tract divisions. Since I focus on external effects, I do not consider the transaction
of units subsidized by the policy. sbi and ubi are two binary indicators that take a value of one if
the sold unit i is located within 400 meters of the border in the subsidized (S) or unsubsidized
(U ) area, respectively, and zero if it is located in a 400-meter wide band in the nontreated area
400 meters from the border (labeled as the control band). post is a dummy that takes a value of
one for the period 2012-2018.
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βS and βU capture spillovers on house prices around the border and estimate the average
effect for the period 2012-2018. Furthermore, they capture the total effect derived in equation
6. I also include a vector containing dwelling characteristics (X
′
i ) usually included in hedonic
models that explain some of the variation in house prices, such as constructed square meters
(and its square), a set of dummies for year of construction, dummies for quality of the building
(as assessed by the cadaster agency), number of floors, a dummy for detached and semidetached
houses, whether there is a garage, balcony or outdoor space, other amenities, and if there is a
slum within 300 meters. In the most controlled specifications, I also include a set of socioe-
conomic and urban infrastructure variables from the 2011 census to control for neighborhood
characteristics20 and the change in tract-level housing prices pre-policy, as these variables may
influence both prices and developers’ investment locations. I also include year-month dummies
(δt) and a set of border dummies (νb), which implies that the coefficients of interest (β
S and
βU ) are estimated using within border-segment variation. Finally, as in Boustan (2012), I also
include the interaction between border and year dummies (δt× νb), thus allowing for a common
border-segment trend since the economic status of neighborhoods along the border may rise
and fall. Using narrowly defined bands together with border-year dummies enables localized
unobserved shocks, as well as underlying local factors that may drive developers’ investment
decisions, to be accounted for.
To obtain unbiased estimates, the control band should not be contaminated by spillovers. In
this sense, using tight bands ensures that units are exposed to the same unobserved factors, but
at the expense of control units being potentially contaminated by externalities. Then, to avoid
estimates being sensitive to the definition of the band width, I provide nonparametric estimates
of spillovers.21 As in every difference-in-differences strategy, the common trend assumption is
required to obtain unbiased causal effects. Through an event-study graph, I provide evidence
that this assumption is likely to hold in my setting.
20I consider density of inhabitants per square km (in log), % of vacant and uninhabitable houses, % of renters,
unemployment rate, % of low-educated head of households, % of historical monuments, and a street quality index.
This index is constructed as a weighted average of several binary indicators such as if the street has public lighting,
if it has trees, if it is paved and in good condition, if the sidewalk is in good condition, if the sidewalk has ramps
for the disabled, if there is information about the street name, if it has storm drains and if there are dumps. For each
indicator, weights are constructed as one minus the average, and they are normalized to sum to one. The index is
bounded between 0 and 1.
21Technical details are explained in Appendix A
15
5.1. Investment exposure to subsidized residential investments
The second strategy uses an investment exposure measure that accounts for developers’ in-
vestment locations along the subsidized border. In particular, I observe that developers focus
their investments at some locations along the subsidized side of the border. This implies that
some unsubsidized sold units were more exposed to subsidized investments than other dwellings
located at more distant locations. I construct a measure that captures the exposure of each un-
subsidized sold unit i to the subsidized investments. This variable is computed as the sum of the
budgets of all projects (98 in total) multiplied by an exponential decay factor. Similar to Autor,
Palmer and Pathak (2016), I adopted an exponential decay function that places larger weights
on nearby subsidized projects. This measure is formally defined as follows:
Intensei =
98∑
j=1
BTj × e
−λdij (8)
where BTj is the budget of project j located at a distance dij (in km) from the sold unit i,
and λ(< 0) is the parameter that governs the decaying rate of weights. Then, Intensei measures
the level of investment that each unit i is exposed to. As the unit is built, this variable enables
measurement of the exposure to scattered, as well as to more concentrated, housing investments.
As λ increases, the level of exposure declines at a faster rate. Figure 3 shows the level of in-
vestment intensity for the city and along the border for λ = −9, where a darker color indicates
larger levels of subsidized investments. I observe that there are high investment levels along
some parts of the subsidized side of the border of area S with respect to area U , while in some
locations, there are no investments. Figure 3 plots the log of the investment intensity as a func-
tion of distance to the boundary, where negative and positive distance values represent locations
in the nontreated and treated areas, respectively. The exposure to these housing developments
increases when approaching the targeted area, while exhibiting a wide range of variation in the
level of intensity that I use to identify the external effects.
I apply a continuous-treatment difference-in-differences approach that uses Intensei as a
continuous-treatment variable. Specifically, I replace the border band indicators in equation 7
by the investment exposure measure. Then, I estimate the following equation:
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pibt = αln(Intensei) + βln(Intensei)× post
+ X
′
iθ + δt + νb + δt × νb + ǫibt (9)
where ln(Intensei) is the log of the intensity of the treatment for a given value of the parame-
ter λ. I explore the sensitivity of the results to different values of λ. As this continuous-treatment
variable is likely to be endogenous due to developers choosing those locations with higher ex-
pected growth in prices, I use the policy, and more specifically its place-based structure, as an
instrument for the intensity measure. I define the instrument as a binary variable that takes a
value of one for sold units located in the treated area and a value of zero for sold units located in
the nontreated area. The coefficient β captures the spillovers effects, and it provides estimates
of the derivative in equation 6. I also include border-year effects to control for local unobserved
confounding factors. This empirical method deals with endogenous location decisions of de-
velopers that are likely to be influenced by future growth of house prices and rental prices. I
also use this latter strategy to estimate the effect of these new developments on criminal activity,
being a more direct measure of neighborhood amenities, and on household income to study the
role of income sorting on housing externalities.
5.2. Threats to identification
My empirical analysis relies on the border being exogenously determined by policymakers
while not being affected by developers’ interests of including places with high expected growth
in house prices. If that were the case and developers had managed to manipulate the definition
of the boundary of the targeted area, then I would observe discontinuities in the house price
gradient at the border before the introduction of the policy. In other words, house prices as
a function of the distance to the border would not be smooth at the boundary, thus implying
neighborhoods with better quality/amenities on the subsidized side of the border. The top panel
in Figure 4 shows house prices in the pre-policy period (2006-2010) as a function of the distance
to the border of treated area S with respect to the nontreated area U . The distance is normalized
to be zero at the border. Positive distance values are defined for area S, while negative values are
defined for area U . Each evenly spaced bin represents the average house price computed using
the data-driven procedure developed in Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2015, 2017), and the
fitted line is estimated using a third-order polynomial controlling for housing characteristics.
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In Figure 4, I observe that house prices are higher, on average, in the nontreated area than in
the treated area, being the richest part of the city. I also observe that the price gradient remains
smooth at the border, with house prices showing a decreasing pattern when moving away from
the unsubsidized area. In Table 2, I formally test for a discontinuity in the house price vector
at the border. Using a kernel-weighted local polynomial (of different orders), the results verify
what I previously observed in the graph, that is, the absence of a discontinuity in the house price
gradient at the border.22
In the post-policy period (2011-2018), the bottom panel of Figure 4 suggests that there is
a slight discontinuity at the border. However, the formal test (in panel b of Table 2) indicates
that there is no jump at the border in this period, which may be explained by externalities going
beyond the boundary. Figure 4 suggests that the policy changed the slope of the price gradient,
which is what my reduced form analysis would be estimating. The fact that discrete jumps are
not found confirms that developers did not succeed in influencing the definition of the border of
the targeted area.
The other concern of my empirical strategy is whether the policy acts as a shifter of res-
idential developments in the treated area. Panel a) in Figure 5 shows the probability of new
residential developments in the pre-policy period (2006-2010) as a function of the distance to
the border of the subsidized area, where the distance is normalized to be zero at the border.
Each evenly spaced bin represents the share of new residential developments at the tract level,
and the fitted line is estimated using a third-order polynomial.23 Before the housing policy, the
probability of new housing developments is larger in the unsubsidized area (with an average of
almost 40%) than in the subsidized areas (with an average of almost 15%). The figure changes
substantially after the introduction of the policy (bottom panel). The probability of residential
developments in the nontreated area experienced a downward shift, and the average decreased
to approximately 30%. Conversely, the targeted area experienced an upward shift in the prob-
ability of residential developments, with the average increasing to approximately 25%. This
22I also checked for discontinuities 100, 200, 300 and 400 meters from the border in area U , but there is no
evidence of discontinuities.
23Again, I used the data-driven procedure developed in Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2015, 2017) to construct
bins.
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shift is mainly observed close to the border. Therefore, the policy incentivized new residential
construction in the treated area, which may be partly due to a crowding-out effects from private
residential investments in the unsubsidized area. Berrutti (2017) finds that the policy has an im-
pact on the distribution of residential construction, as well as on the size of housing produced,
and on densification close to the border. Thus, the policy increases residential investments in the
subsidized area.
6. Results
6.1. Estimates of spillovers on house prices
In Table 3 and Figure 6, I present the results from estimating equation 7 that captures the
effects on 400-meter wide bands around the border, using sold units located in the unsubsi-
dized area and at least 400 meters from the border as the comparison band. Figure 6 reports the
spillover estimates along the border resulting from replacing the post dummy in equation 7 by a
set of year dummies using 2011 (the year the policy was introduced) as the base year, which is
omitted, and controlling for housing characteristics. The top panel indicates that external effects
on house prices increase along the treated area close to the border after the introduction of the
policy. The evidence points to local impacts both during construction (2012-2013) and once the
subsidized housing was built. Observing spillovers during construction is likely to be associated
with initial amenity improvements due to the removal of abandoned buildings and brownfield
sites. It may also be related to the idea that agents tend to develop expectations regarding how lo-
cal housing markets will react once these projects end. The bottom panel indicates the presence
of externalities on the nontreated side of the border following the introduction of the program.
In this case, there is a less evident pattern during the period, and for some years, the effects
dissipate. In both panels, I observe that there are no spillover effects before 2011, which pro-
vides supportive evidence that the common trends assumption is likely to hold. This further
validates the use of this empirical strategy, while it discards the hypothesis that developers react
beforehand, thus affecting local housing markets.
Table 3 reports the average impact on house prices between 2012 and 2018 for different
sets of controls. The first and second rows present the estimates of the spillovers along the
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subsidized and unsubsidized borders, respectively, using 400-meter wide bands. In the first
column, I include border-year effects and housing characteristics, as in Figure 6. The results
indicate an almost 13% increase in house prices on the treated side, while the prices increase by
6.6% on the nontreated side of the border. The point estimates decrease to approximately 12%
in the subsidized band and 6% in the unsubsidized band after controlling for socioeconomic
variables from the 2011 census (column 2). Similar estimates are obtained after also including
pre-policy house price changes at the tract level (column 3). In the first three columns, I use
clustered standard errors at the tract level. Alternatively, in the last three columns, I use the
spatial HAC inference method proposed by Conley (1999) which adjusts for spatial and serial
correlation and is robust to heteroscedasticity. 24 This allows me to deal with the correlation
between nearby sold units located in different tracts, specifically for those units situated close
to the tract edges. By applying this inference method, the standard errors decrease substantially
(approximately 30-40%), and then, I opt to only report the clustered standard errors as they are
more conservative.
In Table 4, I present the results from using 200-meter wide bands, which enables me to test
for decaying patterns on externalities parametrically. Specifically, I consider three 200-meter
wide bands on the treated side and two on the nontreated side, using the same reference group as
in the previous table. Table 4 shows a decaying pattern on spillovers when moving away from
the border. On the subsidized side, externalities are mainly present in the first and second 200
meters, while decreasing in the next 200 meters. Focusing on the third column, the specification
with the highest set of controls, the point estimates indicate that house prices increase around
12% in the first 200 meters, almost 15% in the next 200 meters, and approximately 9% in the
third 200 meters. The slight and slow decay rate observed in estimated spillovers in the targeted
area is explained by the high concentration of housing investments around the border. On the
unsubsidized side, house prices increase almost 9% in the first 200 meters, but then, the external
effect disappears in the next 200 meters. The fast decaying rate in the nontreated part leads to
the conclusion that externalities are highly local.
24I use the code developed by Hsiang (2010). Specifically, I estimate the Conley spatial HAC standard errors
using kernel linear decay weights a la Bartlett, assuming that the spatial correlation vanishes after more than 500
meters and that the serial correlation vanishes after one year.
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I further explore this decaying pattern by estimating spillovers nonparametrically, which has
the advantage of avoiding arbitrary definition of the width of the bands. Specifically, I estimate
spillovers as a nonparametric function of the distance to the border, before and after the intro-
duction of the tax breaks, using the semiparametric differencing approach developed by Yatchew
(1997); Yatchew and No (2001). The results are presented in Figure A.10 in Appendix A. The
distance is normalized to zero at the border, and negative values correspond to the unsubsidized
area and positive values to the subsidized area. The figure shows that when approaching the
border (coming from the nontreated area), spillovers increase, becoming statistically significant
within 200 meters to the border. Similar to the parametric estimates, externalities are higher
on the treated side of the border, while they decay when going into the nontreated area. Both
the parametric and nonparametric estimates capture spillovers along the border; as suggested in
the theoretical framework, these externalities stem from improvements in local amenities and
changes in the income composition of neighborhoods.
Developers chose specific locations along the border, which leads to variation in the level of
exposure to residential developments. The exposure measure I built captures the spatial variation
in the level of the housing investments under this policy. This treatment measure is endogenous,
as it reflects developers’ decisions on location. To mitigate this source of endogeneity, I exploit
the exogenous nature of the place-based structure of the subsidy. Specifically, I instrument the
continuous treatment variable by a binary indicator that takes a value of one for units located
in the targeted area and a value of zero for units in the nontargeted area. Figure 7 shows the
spillover estimates on house prices by year relative to 2011, the base year. This intensity measure
depends on the decaying parameter λ. I report the results for four different λ values25, controlling
for housing characteristics. The figure shows that before the introduction of the policy, the
estimated coefficients are nearly zero and not statistically significant, which provides evidence
supporting the common trend assumption and the validity of this empirical strategy. After its
introduction, the point estimates increase, with spillovers being mainly present after 2013. The
results are not sensitive to the choice of the value of λ. Note that for larger λ values, the precision
increases, while the point estimates decrease, as expected.
In Table 5, I present the results based on estimating equation 9 for λ = 9, considering three
25Similar to Autor, Palmer and Pathak (2016), who construct a measure of rent-control exposure for each parcel,
my investment exposure measure for each sold unit is constructed considering four different λ values (6, 9, 12, 15).
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different specifications. Since the dependent variable is on the log scale, as is the investment
intensity variable, the effects reported in panel a) represent the elasticity of house price with
respect to the subsidized housing investments. In the first column, I control for housing charac-
teristics and border-year dummies as in the event-study graphs. I find positive and statistically
significant effects, with an estimated elasticity of .032. In the second column, I include 2011
census controls, and the elasticity reduces to .028, while it decreases slightly when also adding
pre-trend prices at the tract level as a control in the third column. Using the estimated elasticity
in the third column, I compute the average effect within 400 meters of the border, obtaining
a 15% increase in house prices on the treated side and a 9% increase on the nontreated side.
These effects are larger than the 12% and 6% obtained when using the 400-meter border band
indicators since the previous strategy leads to intention-to-treat estimates. Across specifications,
the instrument seems relevant, as the (Kleibergen-Paap) F-statistic is well above ten, the usual
benchmark. In panel b), I use a binary version of the intensity measure that takes a value of one
whenever the intensity of the treatment is above the median and a value of zero otherwise. I find
that the house price increases in areas with high investment intensity, with estimates ranging
from 17% to 19%.
The empirical results presented here are consistent with amenities being the main determi-
nant of house prices at the local level. In the context of the theoretical framework previously
developed, increasing the stock of new housing in the mid-income neighborhood does not offset
the positive effects that improved amenities and changes in the neighborhood income composi-
tion have on house prices. Ooi and Le (2013) and Zahirovich-Herbert and Gibler (2014) find an
approximately 2% increase in house prices due to new housing supply. Compared to Diamond
and McQuade (2019), the externalities that I find here are higher but more localized.26
Next, I explore whether these externalities are heterogeneous to some neighborhood’s char-
acteristics from the 2011 census. In the first column of Table 6, I analyze whether external effects
are heterogeneous to a street quality index (bounded between 0 and 1) at the tract level. This
index measures the presence of basic urban infrastructure (e.g., public lighting, storm drains,
street names, bus stops, and ramps for the disabled), as well as its quality (e.g., paved streets
26Diamond and McQuade (2019) find a 6.5% increase in house prices for the case of low-income neighborhoods,
and spillovers disappear after 1,500 meters (approximately 1 mile). I find that the increase of 12-17% in house prices
and spillovers vanishes after approximately 200 meters.
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and streets in good condition, sidewalks in good condition, and if there are dumps). I find a
26% increase in house prices in the case of tracts with a street quality index above the median
that are highly exposed to subsidized investments, thus being higher than the baseline estimates.
This result may be partly explained by the complementarities of these developments with the
existing urban infrastructure. Central neighborhoods received significant investments, and since
they have many bus lines and public transportation, which is positively correlated with the index,
this could also explain the remarkable effects. In the second column, I use the share of renters
as another neighborhood dimension. I find that spillovers are higher among tracts with a high
share of renters that are highly exposed to the policy, observing a 21% increase in house prices.
Higher tenant/rental turnover rates may explain the results in these tracts, thus reflecting a more
dynamic change in neighborhood income composition. Higher shares of renters could lead to
faster neighborhood transitions in economic status (Rosenthal, 2008). In the last column, I check
for heterogeneous results depending on the proportion of head of households with low-education
levels. I only observe slightly higher spillovers for tracts with lower shares, but the results are
not statistically significant.
The intensity measure used in previous estimates only makes use of the residential construc-
tion developed under this policy. In Table 7, I consider both subsidized and unsubsidized new
residential supply developed between 2011 and 2013. In the first three columns, I consider the
tract-level sum of the square meters of the new developments. In the last three columns, I use
a binary variable that equals one in the case of tracts where new housing was constructed. The
variable measuring the tract-level subsidized developments is instrumented using the policy spa-
tial scheme as before. Estimates in the first three columns show an elasticity of .02, being similar
to previous estimates, while I find an elasticity of zero for the case of unsubsidized new devel-
opments. The results are similar across specifications. In the last three columns, I consider the
binary tract-level measure and find a 17-18% increase in house prices in tracts with subsidized
housing projects, while there is no evidence of spillovers from new unsubsidized housing. These
results serve as a placebo exercise, as they proves that externalities are caused by the subsidized
investments, not by unsubsidized residential investments.
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6.2. Effects on crime
Most of the subsidized investments involved demolishing abandoned buildings or disused
factories, which usually attract criminal activity and depress house prices (Campbell, Giglio and
Pathak, 2010). Removing neighborhood disamenities may reduce local crime, which may also
affect residential externalities. As a countervailing effect, the housing units developed under this
policy were affordable for middle-high and high-income households, who face a higher proba-
bility of being the target of property offenses. Then, I empirically test whether these residential
investments affect crime patterns using the continuous difference-in-differences estimator that
uses the investment exposure measure for λ = 9 as the treatment variable. Concretely, I esti-
mate equation 9 for three different outcomes, total crime, property crime (defined as theft and
robbery), and nonproperty crime (defined as assaults). For these three outcomes, I use the log of
the yearly counts at the tract level.
Figure 8 presents the yearly estimates for total crime, property crime, and nonproperty crime.
Regarding total crime (top panel), I observe a reduction in the following years after the introduc-
tion of the policy, but after 2015, the crime rates seem to revert to pre-policy levels. For property
crime (mid-panel), the evidence shows a similar pattern, with the reduction being statistically
significant for a couple of years in this case. The graph also indicates a temporary reduction,
as point estimates go back to zero after 2015. This finding suggests that the initial reduction
due to the removal of crime hubs may be offset by the fact that neighborhoods started being
populated by higher-income dwellers. The bottom panel shows no effect on nonproperty crime.
For the three outcomes, I observe that in the pre-policy period, the estimated coefficients are not
statistically significant, which enhances the robustness of these results.
In Table 8, I present the effect for the period 2012-2018. For each outcome, I consider two
specifications. The first includes border-year dummies and 2011 census controls, and the second
adds initial crime levels for the year 2006 to control for mean reversion in crime levels. The first
two columns of panel a) indicate that there is no statistically significant reduction in total crime.
The next two columns also show that there is no effect on property crime, while the last two
columns reveal no effect for nonproperty crime rates. In panel b), I consider the binary treatment
variable that takes a value of one for tracts with intensity higher than the median. The results
show approximately 14% and 19% reductions in total crime and property crime, respectively,
using the specification that also includes the initial crime levels. However, the point estimates
are not statistically significant. For nonproperty crime, there is a nonnegligible reduction of
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8.3%, but again, this result is not statistically significant. In the case of the total and property
crime rates, the absence of an effect may be explained by an influx of more affluent residents. I
explore the effect of housing supply on the neighborhood income mix in the next section.
In Table 9, I turn to analyzing property crime according to who is the victim of the crime.
Specifically, I consider the logarithm of the number of offenses committed on houses and per-
sons, while the remaining group, labeled as ‘other’, includes offenses committed on businesses,
vehicles, and not defined.27 Again, I use the investment intensity for λ = 9 as the treatment
variable. I observe a reduction in property crime committed on houses and persons statistically
significant at the 10% level. Additionally, I find that there is no effect in the case of property
crime committed on businesses and vehicles and classified as not defined. I cannot disentangle
whether the reduction in crime committed on houses/persons is due to the removal of crime hubs
or more investments in safety measures taken by new dwellers. Given that the effects are mainly
observed the year after the introduction of the policy, the reduction in crime is more likely to be
explained by the removal of crime spots.
6.3. Effects on socioeconomic outcomes
From a theoretical perspective, the new residential construction leads to an increase in the
share of high-income dwellers in the middle-income neighborhood that received these housing
investments. Thus, I test whether this prediction holds by focusing on the effect of the pol-
icy on household income. Specifically, I focus on the disposable household income reported
in the National Household Survey, which is drawn from a stratified random sample carried out
every year. This survey contains census tract identifiers that allow me to merge this informa-
tion with the level of exposure to the new housing investments at the tract level. Then, I test
whether household income increased in highly exposed tracts using the continuous difference-
in-differences estimator. The intensity measure is instrumented by a binary variable that takes a
value of one for tracts in the treated area.
In Figure 9, I present the estimates by year relative to the year 2011. I first consider the
disposable household income (per capita) with rental value (top panel). I observe that before
27I also considered offenses committed on businesses and vehicles separately, but I did not find significant effects.
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the introduction of the policy, the estimated coefficients are close to zero and not statistically
significant. Two years after the introduction of the policy, the estimates are still close to zero,
while after 2013, I observe a break in the trend, with most point estimates being above zero and
statistically significant.28 The mid-panel presents the event-study graph that results from using
the disposable household income (per capita) without rental value. Overall, I observe a similar
pattern, but in this case, the effects are smaller. In the bottom panel, I turn to analyzing the effect
on the rental value. The results show that the effect on disposable household income is partly
driven by a substantial increase in the rental value in areas with high investment exposure. This
also confirms that the willingness to pay in areas that face new supply increased.
In Table 10, I present the estimates for the period 2012-2018. In panel a), I regress the dis-
posable household income (in log) with rental value (first column), without rental value (second
column), and with log of rental value (third column) on the log of the intensity measure for the
decay parameter λ = 9. For each panel and in each column, I report the F-statistics from the
first stage that uses the policy border as the instrument for the investment intensity measure. In
each regression, I control for border-year dummies and used 2011 census controls at the tract
level. The first column shows an elasticity of .011, which is statistically significant at the 5%
level, while there is no effect when considering the disposable household income without rental
value (second column). The third column shows that the policy affects rental values, with an es-
timated elasticity of .031. In panel b), I use a binary exposure measure that takes a value of one
for intensities above the median. The results indicate almost 10% and 6% increases in household
income with and without rental value, respectively, but with only the first case being statistically
significant at the 5% level. The third column shows a remarkable 26% in rental values. These
findings confirm the predictions of the theoretical framework, as I observe an increase in the
income of dwellers in the treated area.
7. Conclusions
This paper estimates spillover effects from new residential developments on house prices,
crime records, and household income. The supply of new housing was incentivized through tax
28The National Statistics Office reported that the household income from the 2016 National Household Survey
was subject to some corrections after realizing the presence of missing observations. This may be correlated with
the absence of an effect for that year.
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breaks applied in a spatially defined middle-income area in the city of Montevideo that resulted
in major investments in the housing sector. I find evidence of a substantial increase in the
price of the housing surrounding the subsidized investments, with residential externalities being
highly local. The house prices increase by 12-17%, and this effect tends to vanish after almost
200 meters. The remarkable effects contrast with previous evidence on spillovers from new
residential developments in general and from affordable housing but are in line with estimates
from quantitative spatial models, such as those in Ahlfeldt et al. (2015).29 Moreover, in areas
with a high share of renters, externalities have a marked presence, suggesting that the spillovers
can be highly heterogeneous and may be dependent on initial neighborhood characteristics. This
has also been suggested in the literature (Baum-Snow and Marion, 2009; Eriksen and Rosenthal,
2010; Diamond and McQuade, 2019). Additionally, I analyze the effect of new housing supply
on crime rates. I find that the property crime rate decreases, but this effect is not long lasting,
as rates converge to pre-policy levels. Nonproperty crime remains unchanged - this casts doubt
on crime being one of the main drivers of these spillovers. Finally, there is evidence that the
income mix of neighborhoods that received large housing investments changed.
The results of this paper enhance the role of amenities in the determination of house prices
locally. The findings also indicate that the new housing supply contributed to the revitalization
of some middle-income areas of the city. In this sense, such policies may be justified based
on externalities. Nevertheless, as the willingness to pay to live in these areas increases, the
affordability of housing in these neighborhoods tends to be reduced. It is worth noting that the
provision of affordable housing was also one of the aims of this legislation, yet little has been
achieved in this regard because of the absence of any rules targeting new housing developments
to more vulnerable households. As such, these findings highlight the apparent trade-off between
inducing rapid urban revitalization and making housing affordable, two first-order problems that
seem to be addressed by two different policies.
29Ooi and Le (2013) and Zahirovich-Herbert and Gibler (2014) find an approximate 2% increase in local house
prices due to new housing supply. Diamond and McQuade (2019) find a 6.5% increase in the prices of dwellings
located nearby LIHTC developments in low-income neighborhoods.
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Tables
TABLE 1
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF OUTCOME AND CONTROL VARIABLES
Subsidized side Unsubsidized side
Within (0 m,400 m] Within [0 m,400 m) Within [400 m,800 m)
Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
Outcome variables (in 2011)
House prices (in log) 11.002 8.855 12.707 11.278 9.069 12.766 11.462 9.306 12.924
Observations 1,121 1,453 918
All type of crimes (in log) 4.352 2.944 6.209 4.630 3.258 6.290 4.364 3.584 5.793
Observations 71 69 33
Property crime (in log) 4.086 2.639 5.892 4.394 2.996 5.964 4.143 3.401 5.576
Observations 71 69 33
Nonproperty crime (in log) 1.093 0.000 3.045 .961 0.000 3.761 .764 0.000 2.485
Observations 71 69 33
Household income PC (in log) w/ rental value 9.892 7.943 11.765 10.072 7.617 12.323 10.172 8.197 12.505
Observations 815 1,029 535
Household income PC (in log) w/o rental value 9.604 7.359 11.667 9.781 7.162 12.292 9.865 6.506 12.447
Observations 815 1,029 535
Rental value (in log) 9.049 4.546 10.309 9.265 6.139 10.525 9.409 7.313 11.247
Observations 815 1,029 535
2011 census variables
Density (inhabitants per km2, in log) 9.491 8.190 10.616 9.257 2.308 10.758 9.372 8.212 10.167
% of occupied dwellings 89.542 66.922 96.278 90.420 75.798 100.000 90.022 73.857 95.161
% of vacant or uninhabitable dwellings 3.219 0.509 7.023 2.861 0.000 8.434 2.949 0.538 8.041
% of buildings in bad condition 0.684 0.000 6.452 0.478 0.000 3.698 0.481 0.000 5.525
% of rented dwellings 38.434 12.894 58.398 31.084 0.000 51.421 28.552 9.859 44.697
Unemployment rate 5.979 2.723 8.619 5.254 2.827 11.111 5.002 3.168 8.309
% of low-educated head of households 9.101 2.157 38.729 6.668 1.990 40.000 6.284 2.174 13.622
Street quality index [0,1] 0.562 0.278 0.728 0.518 0.261 0.686 0.549 0.433 0.710
Observations 71 69 33
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TABLE 2
TESTING FOR DISCONTINUITIES IN THE HOUSE PRICE GRADIENT AT THE BORDER.
REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY ESTIMATES.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
a) House prices (in log), pre-intervention period (2006-2010)
Polynomial order 1 2 3 4
✶[Boundary distance > 0] 0.004 0.020 0.022 0.021
(0.033) (0.042) (0.047) (0.049)
Robust p-value (a) .837 .599 .611 .701
Robust 95% CI (a) [.084,-.068] [.115,-.066] [.122,-.072] [.118,-.080]
Observations 25,838 25,838 25,838 25,838
Effective nbr. of obs. 4,497 | 4,397 4,558 | 4,524 5,572 | 5,683 6,486 | 6,855
Nbr. of clusters 176 162 160 175
Bandwidth (in km) .286 .294 .386 .498
b) House prices (in log), post-intervention period (2011-2018)
Polynomial order 1 2 3 4
✶[Boundary distance > 0] -0.026 -0.010 -0.030 -0.055
(0.042) (0.051) (0.058) (0.064)
Robust p-value (a) .723 .827 .537 .337
Robust 95% CI (a) [.074,-.107] [.094,-.118] [.080,-.153] [.065,-.191]
Observations 34,823 34,823 34,823 34,823
Effective nbr. of obs. 5,741 | 4,825 5,866 | 5,030 7,113 | 6,089 8,019 | 7,172
Nbr. of clusters 161 144 156 174
Bandwidth (in km) .238 .250 .318 .380
Notes: Columns (i) to (iv) are estimated using the robust bias-corrected procedure and the optimal
(covariate-adjusted and cluster-robust) bandwidth selection criteria developed in Calonico, Cattaneo and
Titiunik (2014, 2017); Calonico et al. (2018). All estimates are computed using a triangular kernel func-
tion and one common MSE-optimal bandwidth. Covariates include year-month dummies, border-year
dummies, and dwelling characteristics. (a) Robust p-values and robust 95% CIs are constructed using
clustered-robust standard errors at the tract level. Conventional clustered standard errors are in parenthe-
sis, where ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
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TABLE 3
SPILLOVER ESTIMATES ON HOUSE PRICES. DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES STRATEGY
USING 400-METER WIDE BANDS.
Spatial HAC inference(a)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Distance to the border (di):
Subsidized border band (sb)
✶{0m < di ≤ 400m} × post 0.128*** 0.116*** 0.115*** 0.128*** 0.117*** 0.115***
(0.032) (0.030) (0.030) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Unsubsidized border band (ub)
✶{0m ≤ di < 400m} × post 0.066*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.066*** 0.060*** 0.060***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Housing characteristics Y Y Y Y Y Y
Border-year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
2011 census controls N Y Y N Y Y
∆ house prices pre-policy at the tract level N N Y N N Y
Observations 37,741 37,741 37,741 37,741 37,741 37,741
Number of clusters 162 162 162
Adjusted R squared 0.497 0.507 0.507 0.495 0.507 0.507
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of house prices. The comparison group is composed of sold units located in the unsubsi-
dized area (U ) that are between 400 and 800 meters from the border. All regressions include year-month dummies. In columns (i)
to (iii), clustered standard errors at the tract level are used. (a) In columns (iv) to (vi), the spatial HAC standard errors developed
in Conley (1999); Conley and Molinari (2007) are used; the linear decay kernel weights (a la Bartlett) used are assumed to vanish
above 500 meters, and serial correlation is assumed to vanish after one year. *** significant at the 1% level. ** significant at the
5% level. * significant at the 10% level.
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TABLE 4
SPILLOVER ESTIMATES ON HOUSE PRICES. DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES STRATEGY
USING 200-METER WIDE BANDS.
(i) (ii) (iii)
Distance to the border (di):
Subsidized border band (sb)
✶{0m < di ≤ 200m} × post 0.129*** 0.122*** 0.121***
(0.042) (0.041) (0.041)
✶{200m < di ≤ 400m} × post 0.177*** 0.150*** 0.147***
(0.039) (0.035) (0.034)
✶{400m < di ≤ 600m} × post 0.093*** 0.089*** 0.088***
(0.035) (0.033) (0.033)
Unsubsidized border band (ub)
✶{0m ≤ di < 200m} × post 0.097*** 0.089*** 0.088***
(0.028) (0.026) (0.026)
✶{200m ≤ di < 400m} × post 0.019 0.014 0.013
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027)
Housing characteristics Y Y Y
Border-year dummies Y Y Y
2011 census controls N Y Y
∆ house prices pre-policy at the tract level N N Y
Observations 42,173 42,173 42,173
Number of clusters 182 182 182
Adjusted R squared 0.496 0.508 0.509
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of house prices. The comparison group is com-
posed of sold units located in the unsubsidized area (U ) that are between 400 and 800
meters from the border. All regressions include year-month dummies. Clustered standard
errors at the tract level are used. *** significant at the 1% level. ** significant at the 5%
level. * significant at the 10% level.
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TABLE 5
SPILLOVER ESTIMATES ON HOUSE PRICES. CONTINUOUS DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES
ESTIMATOR.
(i) (ii) (iii)
a) Continuous exposure measure
ln(Intense) × post 0.032*** 0.028*** 0.027***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
F-statistics 37.120 39.627 40.473
b) Binary exposure measure
✶[ln(Intense) > p50th] × post 0.187** 0.175** 0.172**
(0.082) (0.073) (0.073)
F-statistics 20.369 23.289 23.372
Housing characteristics Y Y Y
Border-year dummies Y Y Y
2011 census controls N Y Y
∆ house prices pre-policy at the tract level N N Y
Observations 37,741 37,741 37,741
Nbr. of clusters 162 162 162
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of house prices. The main independent variable
is the investment exposure measure Intense, which depends on the decaying parameter
λ. These estimates are produced using an exposure measure with λ = 9. Intense is
instrumented by a binary variable that takes a value of one for sold units in the subsidized
area and zero for sold unit in the unsubsidized area. All regressions include year-month
dummies. Clustered standard errors at the tract level are used. *** significant at the 1%
level. ** significant at the 5% level. * significant at the 10% level.
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TABLE 6
SPILLOVER ESTIMATES ON HOUSE PRICES. CONTINUOUS DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES
ESTIMATOR, HETEROGENEOUS ANALYSES.
ci =
% of head of
Street HH with low
quality index % of renters education level
(i) (ii) (iii)
✶[ln(Intense) > p50th] × ✶{ci ≥ p50th} × post 0.263*** 0.205** 0.084
(0.099) (0.094) (0.094)
✶[ln(Intense) > p50th] × ✶{ci < p50th} × post 0.063 0.124 0.112
(0.090) (0.209) (0.072)
Observations 37,741 37,741 37,741
Nbr. of clusters 162 162 162
F-statistics 7.641 2.152 7.709
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of house prices. The main independent variable is the investment exposure
measure Intense, which depends on the decaying parameter λ. These estimates are produced using an exposure measure
with λ = 9. Intense is instrumented by a binary variable that takes a value of one for sold units in the subsidized area and
zero for sold units located in the unsubsidized area. All regressions include year-month dummies, border and border-year
dummies, 2011 census controls, and change in house prices (pre-policy period, 2006-2010) at the tract level. Clustered
standard errors at the tract level are used. *** significant at the 1% level. ** significant at the 5% level. * significant at
the 10% level.
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TABLE 7
SPILLOVER ESTIMATES ON HOUSE PRICES. CONTINUOUS DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES
ESTIMATOR. SUBSIDIZED VS UNSUBSIDIZED DEVELOPMENTS.
New residential developments in m2 (a) binary (b)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Subsidized x post 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.184*** 0.173*** 0.171***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.061) (0.057) (0.057)
Unsubsidized x post 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.009 0.011 0.011
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.032) (0.030) (0.029)
F-statistics 28.990 19.171 18.983 26.066 17.967 17.853
Housing characteristics Y Y Y Y Y Y
Border-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
2011 census controls N Y Y N Y Y
∆ house prices pre-policy at the tract level N N Y N N Y
Observations 37,741 37,741 37,741 37,741 37,741 37,741
Nbr. of clusters 162 162 162 162 162 162
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of house prices. (a) In the first three columns, the main independent variable is the sum
of the area of new residential developments (in log) in a given tract. (b) In the last three columns, I use a binary version that takes
a value of one whenever there were residential developments in the tract. I consider new residential developments ready to sell
between 2013 and 2016. The sum of subsidized residential developments is instrumented by a binary measure that takes a value
of one for tracts in the subsidized area and zero for tracts in the unsubsidized area. All regressions include year-month dummies.
Clustered standard errors at the tract level are used. *** significant at the 1% level. ** significant at the 5% level. * significant at the
10% level.
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TABLE 8
EFFECTS ON CRIME RECORDS. CONTINUOUS DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATOR.
All type Property crime Nonproperty crime
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
a) Continuous exposure measure
ln(Intense) × post -0.031 -0.020 -0.042* -0.027 -0.014 -0.012
(0.025) (0.021) (0.025) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024)
F-statistics 80.040 80.546 80.040 80.586 80.040 80.201
b) Binary exposure measure
✶[ln(Intense) > p50th] × post -0.216 -0.138 -0.290 -0.188 -0.094 -0.083
(0.173) (0.147) (0.178) (0.149) (0.164) (0.164)
F-statistics 52.202 52.485 52.202 52.443 52.202 52.792
Border-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
2011 census controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Initial crime level N Y N Y N Y
Observations 2,249 2,249 2,249 2,249 2,249 2,249
Nbr. of clusters 173 173 173 173 173 173
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the count of reported crimes at the tract level. Property crime includes
theft and robbery, while nonproperty crime includes assault. The main independent variable is the investment expo-
sure measure Intense, which depends on the decaying parameter λ. These estimates are produced using an exposure
measure with λ = 9. Intense is instrumented by a binary variable that takes a value of one if the tract is located
in the subsidized area and zero if the tract located in the unsubsidized area. All regressions include year dummies.
Clustered standard errors at the tract level are used. *** significant at the 1% level. ** significant at the 5% level. *
significant at the 10% level.
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TABLE 9
EFFECTS ON PROPERTY CRIME RECORDS BY TYPE. CONTINUOUS
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATOR.
Property crime committed on
houses/persons other
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
✶[ln(Intense) > p50th] × post -0.344* -0.296* -0.259 -0.109
(0.179) (0.159) (0.189) (0.158)
F-statistics 52.202 52.151 52.202 52.855
Border-year FE Y Y Y Y
Controls at the tract level Y Y Y Y
Initial crime level N Y N Y
Observations 2,249 2,249 2,249 2,249
Nbr. of clusters 173 173 173 173
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the count of reported crimes at the tract
level. Property crime includes theft and robbery, while nonproperty crime includes
assault. The main independent variable is the investment exposure measure Intense,
which depends on the decaying parameter λ. These estimates are produced using an
exposure measure with λ = 9. Intense is instrumented by a binary variable that takes
a value of one if the tract is located in the subsidized area and zero if the tract located
in the unsubsidized area. All regressions include year dummies, border and border-
year dummies, 2011 census controls, and the initial level of crime. Clustered standard
errors at the tract level are used. *** significant at the 1% level. ** significant at the
5% level. * significant at the 10% level.
TABLE 10
EFFECTS ON SOCIOECONOMIC OUTCOMES. CONTINUOUS DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES
ESTIMATOR.
Household income PC
w/ rental value w/o rental value Rental value
(i) (ii) (iii)
a) Continuous exposure measure
ln(Intense) × post 0.011** 0.007 0.031***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
F-statistics 46.149 46.149 46.149
b) Binary exposure measure
✶[ln(Intense) > p50th] × post 0.098** 0.058 0.262***
(0.041) (0.040) (0.056)
F-statistics 33.754 33.754 33.754
Observations 42,610 42,610 42,610
Nbr. of clusters 236 236 236
Notes: In the first column, the dependent variable is the log of the disposable household income per capita
with rental value, while in the second column, the rental value is not included. In the case of owned houses,
the hypothetical self-reported rental value is assigned. The main independent variable is the investment
exposure measure Intense, which depends on the decaying parameter λ. These estimates are produced
using an exposure measure with λ = 9. Intense is instrumented by a binary variable that takes a value
of one if the tract is located in the subsidized area and zero if the tract located in the unsubsidized area.
All regressions include year-month dummies, border and border-year dummies, and 2011 census controls.
Clustered standard errors at the tract level are used. *** significant at the 1% level. ** significant at the 5%
level. * significant at the 10% level.
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Figures
FIGURE 1
PLACE-BASED SCHEME FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS IN MONTEVIDEO (URUGUAY)
Rural area
Zone S: subsidy for new construction
Suburbs (no subsidy for new construction)
Zone U: no subsidy for new construction
S
U
Notes: The policy was introduced in August of 2011. The subsidy for new construction projects only applies in the
gray area S.
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FIGURE 2
MODEL ILLUSTRATION
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b) Increasing the stock of new housing in community 1
Notes: Panel 2 shows the model’s equilibrium, which is determined by the intersection of the bid functions -
solid line for high-income households and dashed line for middle-income households. Panel 2 shows the effect of
increasing the stock of new housing in community 1 on P1 and Q. The policy leads to an upward shift in both bid
functions. At the new equilibrium, both the share of more affluent residents and the house prices in community 1
increase.
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FIGURE 3
EXPOSURE TO SUBSIDIZED INVESTMENTS
(A) INVESTMENT INTENSITY MAP
(B) LOG OF THE INVESTMENT INTENSITY AS A FUNCTION OF DISTANCE TO THE BORDER
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Notes: This measure captures the level of investment intensity to which each sold unit i is exposed. It is built as the
weighted sum of all project budgets using weights that follow an exponential decay scheme. Here, the decay rate
λ = 9. In panel a), higher levels of investment intensity are represented with darker tones. In panel b), the solid
lines are local linear fits to the plotted bins for the unsubsidized area (at the left of the border) and the subsidized
area (at the right of the border), obtained using an Epanechnikov kernel function.
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FIGURE 4
HOUSE PRICES AS A FUNCTION OF DISTANCE TO THE BORDER
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a) Before-intervention (2006-2010)
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b) After-intervention (2011-2018)
Notes: The distance is normalized to be zero at the border; positive values correspond to the subsidized area S,
while negatives correspond to the unsubsidized area U . Each evenly spaced bin represents the average house price
(in log). Bins are constructed using the (IMSE-optimal) data-driven bandwidth selection criteria developed in
Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2015, 2017), which allows confidence intervals for each bin. The solid line is
estimated using a third-order polynomial and a triangular kernel function.
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FIGURE 5
RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS AROUND THE BORDER
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a) Before-intervention (2006-2010)
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
-1 -.5 0 .5 1
Boundary distance (in km)
b) After-intervention (2011-2018)
Notes: The distance is normalized to be zero at the border; positive values correspond to the subsidized area S,
while negatives correspond to the unsubsidized area U . Each evenly spaced bin represents the share of tracts with
residential developments. Bins are constructed using the (IMSE-optimal) data-driven bandwidth selection criteria
developed in Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2015, 2017), which allows confidence intervals for each bin. The
fitted line is estimated using a fourth-order polynomial and a triangular kernel function.
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FIGURE 6
EVENT STUDY OF SPILLOVER ESTIMATES ON HOUSE PRICES
* DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES STRATEGY USING 400-METER WIDE BANDS
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Notes: The dependent variable is the log of house prices. The comparison group is composed of sold units located
in the unsubsidized area (U ) that are between 400 and 800 meters from the border. All regressions include year-
month dummies, border and border-year dummies, and housing characteristics. Clustered standard errors at the
tract level are used to build 95% confidence intervals.
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FIGURE 7
EVENT STUDY OF SPILLOVER ESTIMATES ON HOUSE PRICES
* CONTINUOUS DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATOR
-
.
1
-
.
05
0
.
05
.
1
D
iff
er
en
ce
 in
 h
ou
se
 p
ric
es
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
lambda = 6
-
.
1
-
.
05
0
.
05
.
1
D
iff
er
en
ce
 in
 h
ou
se
 p
ric
es
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
lambda = 9
-
.
1
-
.
05
0
.
05
.
1
D
iff
er
en
ce
 in
 h
ou
se
 p
ric
es
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
lambda = 12
-
.
1
-
.
05
0
.
05
.
1
D
iff
er
en
ce
 in
 h
ou
se
 p
ric
es
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
lambda = 15
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of house prices. The main independent variable is the investment exposure
measure Intense, which depends on the decaying parameter λ. These estimates are produced using an exposure
measure with λ = 9. Intense is instrumented by a binary variable that takes a value of one for sold units in the
subsidized area and zero for sold units in the unsubsidized area. All regressions include year-month dummies,
border and border-year dummies, and housing characteristics. Clustered standard errors at the tract level are used
to build 95% confidence intervals.
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FIGURE 8
EVENT STUDY OF THE EFFECTS ON CRIME RECORDS
* CONTINUOUS DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATOR
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c) Non-property
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the yearly count of reported crimes at the tract level. Property crime
includes theft and robbery, while nonproperty crime includes assault. The main independent variable is the invest-
ment exposure measure Intense, which depends on the decaying parameter λ. These estimates are produced using
an exposure measure with λ = 9. Intense is instrumented by a binary variable that takes a value of one if the tract is
located in the subsidized area and zero if the tract is located in the unsubsidized area. All regressions include year
dummies, border and border-year dummies, and 2011 census controls. Clustered standard errors at the tract level
are used to build 95% confidence intervals.
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FIGURE 9
EVENT STUDY OF THE EFFECTS ON SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES
* CONTINUOUS DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATOR
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a) Household income PC w/ rental value
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Notes: In panel a), the dependent variable is the log of the disposable household income per capita with rental
value, while in panel b), the rental value is not included. Panel c) considers the log of the rental value. In the
case of owned houses, the hypothetical self-reported rental value is assigned. The main independent variable is the
investment exposure measure Intense, which depends on the decaying parameter λ. These estimates are produced
using an exposure measure with λ = 9. Intense is instrumented by a binary variable that takes a value of one if the
tract is located in the subsidized area and zero if the tract is located in the unsubsidized area. All regressions include
year-month dummies, border and border-year dummies, and 2011 census controls. Clustered standard errors at the
tract level are used to build 95% confidence intervals.
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Appendices
A. Nonparametric estimates
I estimate the following hedonic semiparametric price equation by using the differencing
approach developed by Yatchew (1997); Yatchew and No (2001):
pi,b,t = ft(di,b) +X
′
iθ + δt + δt × νb + ǫi,b,t (A.1)
pi,b,t is the logarithm of house prices of sold unit i at border-segment b in year-month t. I
exclude sold units that were subsidized by the policy. ft(di,b) is a nonparametric term that
depends on the distance of each land lot to the border of the subsidized area with respect to
the unsubsidized area, and it enables measurement of how local spillovers evolve when moving
away from the border before and after the intervention. Xi contains housing characteristics, as
well as socioeconomic variables at the tract level. Housing characteristics include constructed
square meters (and its square), a set of dummies for year of construction, dummies for the quality
of the building (as assessed by the cadaster agency), number of floors, a dummy for detached
and semidetached houses, whether there is a garage, balcony or outdoor space, other amenities,
and if there is a slum within 300 meters. As the tract level covariate, I consider the density
of inhabitants per square km (in log), % of vacant and uninhabitable houses, % of renters, the
unemployment rate, % of low-educated head of households, % of historic monuments, and a
street quality index. δt denotes year effects and δt × νb border-year fixed effects.
The parametric and nonparametric components are assumed to be additively separable. The
differencing approach of Yatchew (1997) is followed in order to obtain an estimate of the non-
parametric part. The function ft(di,b) is estimated separately for the pre-policy period and for the
policy following the introduction of the policy. Then, I obtain f̂pre(di,b) and f̂post(di,b). The blue
line in Figure A.10 shows the difference between f̂post(di,b) and f̂pre(di,b), which is normalized
using the average estimated difference for the control band (defined as units located between
400 and 800 meters from the border in the unsubsidized area).
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FIGURE A.10
NONPARAMETRIC SPILLOVER ESTIMATES ON HOUSE PRICES. INTENTION-TO-TREAT
STRATEGY
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Notes: The green line is the difference before and after the policy as a nonparametric function of the distance to
the border. Estimates are obtained using a semiparametric approach developed by Yatchew (1997); Yatchew and
No (2001). The parametric part includes year-month fixed effects, border-year fixed effects, housing characteristics
and census block socioeconomic variables. Confidence intervals are constructed using the bootstrap standard error
with 500 replications. The results are normalized to the average change in house prices in a control band defined as
transacted units between -800 and -400 meters.
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